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Abstract
Based on the review of the modern world economic literature, there were revealed polar approaches of researchers to estima-
tion of the role of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) in world economic processes in whole and its influence on the economic 
development of separate countries. There were analyzed institutional changes in IMF architecture and management system that 
favored its transparency, efficiency and increase of trust to the activity of the Fund from the world society. 
Based on the dynamic approach to the analysis of credit cooperation of countries-recipients with IMF, there were revealed 
factors that caused differences in duration of series of IMF lending programs (spell) for transition economies and ones that determine 
recidivism of their credit relations with the Fund. Among other ones, the determining role is played by the technical assistance of the 
Fund that favored institutional establishment of unstable economic systems, search for consensus between IMF staff members and 
governments of countries about formation of the policy of conditionality and effectiveness of its realization. 
The article presents chronologization and analytic estimation of main stages of cooperation between Ukraine and IMF, esti-
mates the net transfers of financial resources of the Fund, elucidates conditions of the incomplete drawn of granted credit resources 
by Ukraine, causes of finishing credit cooperation and transition to technical one at different stages. At the end there was made a 
conclusion that main efforts must be directed on constructing native economic system a self-sufficient macroeconomic pattern of the 
development of the native economic system.
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1. Introduction 
Publications in the world economic literature testify to the ambiguous estimation of IMF ac-
tivity. Some economists think that it realizes an important function in the modern global economy, 
other ones argue that IMF became a non-representative, ineffective organization that induces moral 
risks, and the world would be better without it [1, 2].
Undoubtedly, IMF played an important role, in the world global economy for seventy years, 
especially as to the solution of problems of providing stability of national economies and inter-
national monetary-financial system in whole. The Fund is not only a source of external financial 
resources, but became a center of the elaoration, support and realization of a development strategy 
of developing countries. IMF acts as a confident adviser of a government, at that using the experi-
ence of other countries and information from power structures that they are not inclined to share 
with rating agencies and investment banks [3]. The combination of recommendations and financial 
resources help to accelerate processes of achieving macroeconomic stabilization. 
At the same time, in last decades there are observed regular institutional changes in both 
institutional model of IMF functioning and relations between the Fund and countries-members. It 
is manifested especially in the duration of cooperation between countries-borrowers and the Fund. 
Separate countries demonstrate the high inclination to widen credit relations with IMF. Among fac-
tors that determine the duration and frequency of addresses of countries to IMF for credit support, 
economists especially underline the effectiveness of previous credit programs in providing mac-
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roeconomic stabilization. But the modern economic literature pays not enough attention to inves-
tigating factors that determine the duration of cooperation of the Fund with transition economies, 
especially, revealing causes that conditioned differences in the type of IMF participation in trans-
formation processes, duration, scales and effectiveness of credit relations in post-Soviet countries. 
2. Aim of research
The study of economic and institutional changes that determine the duration and fre-
quency of cooperation between transition economies and IMF, and also causes that conditioned 
differences in the effectiveness and type of Fund’s participation in processes of system transfor-
mation in these countries. 
3. Materials and methods
The main results of the scientific research were obtained, based on using general scientific 
and special cognitive methods, especially: 
– historical-philosophical, dialectic methods, analysis and synthesis – for revealing factors 
and results of the evolution of the institutional model of IMF functioning under conditions of inten-
sifying processes of financialization of economy and global financial instability; 
– generalization and systematization – at studying modern tendencies, manifested in the 
type of IMF cooperation with developing countries, its scales and factors that determine its dura-
tion, frequency and inclination of a country to widening credit cooperation with the Fund; 
– principles of complementarity – at studying political, historical mental, social and eco-
nomic factors of effective cooperation of the Baltic post-soviet countries with IMF in attain-
ing macroeconomic stabilization and providing conditions of the further economic growth and 
revealing causes of the low institutional and economic effectiveness of cooperation between 
Ukraine and IMF;
– methods of collation and comparison – at studying peculiarities of methodological 
approaches to estimating the economic effectiveness of credit programs and technical assis-
tance of IMF;
– methods of analysis of interconnections – at revealing the influence of credits, given by the 
Fund on processes of macroeconomic stabilization in Ukraine at different stages of cooperation; 
– methods of regression and correlation analysis – for estimating the effectiveness of credit 
cooperation with IMF and influence of IMF credits on the dynamics of key macroeconomic param-
eters of Ukraine in 1994–2017;
– graphic and table methods – for visualization of the dynamics of credit cooperation between 
Ukraine and IMF and macroeconomic indications of the native economy and research results. 
4. Results
During the last decades IMF position in the world financial architecture a bit changed – its 
activity became more transparent and understood for the external world. The Fund also demon-
strated the ability to study its own experience and to introduce essential changes in instruments 
of control and mechanisms of giving credit resources, especially after the world financial crisis. 
During the last years the Fund faced new challenges, conditioned by processes of financialization 
and intensification of global financial instability. Distrust manifestation of the world community 
to the many-sided financial cooperation and activity of both national and international financial 
institutions became more often. It needed from IMF the critical reinterpretation and improvement 
of mechanisms of management and accountability realization that, according to coworkers and 
leaders of the Fund, favors trust strengthening. 
For this aim there was created a series of institutions, that must provide transparency, 
effectiveness and to raise trust to the activity of such world organizations – in 1998 the USA 
congress created The International Financial Institution Advisory Commission, also known as 
Meltser commission, which main task is to produce of recommendations for forming the USA 
policy as to multilateral agreements of IMF, World bank group, bank of international calcula-
tions and WTO [4].
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In 2001 there was created the special subdivision of IMF – (The Independent Evaluation 
Office (IEO). According to its authorities, it is completely independent from IMF leaders and must 
provide the independent and objective estimation of policy and activity of the Fund, its external 
credit solvency, transparent activity of the international financial institution and strengthening of 
leaders’ responsibility for made political and financial decisions that, in its turn, favors strength-
ening of the external authority of the Fund, support of institutional management and legitimacy of 
the Fund among its stakeholders. 
IEO in 2002 firstly published a report, studied causes of the growing duration of credit co-
operation between separate countries-borrowers and IMF. This phenomenon finally causes anxiety 
in both countries – main creditors of IMF and in international financial community. One of conclu-
sions, made by IOE specialists is that membership in IMF and active participation of members in 
its programs condition the long dependence of a borrower from IMF resources [5].
In 1950–1960 the duration of credit programs of IMF cooperation with countries-mem-
bers was in average 1–2 years. But during the last decades of ХХ century, there was traced the 
increase of credit programs duration to three years, and the use of a series of them by separate 
countries during five and more years. Researchers think that main causes of the increase of such 
cooperation duration are more frequent bank and monetary crises, suffered by economic systems 
of different countries. The analysis of IMF credit programs for different countries demonstrated 
that the growth of duration and intensity of credit cooperation is typical, in first turn, for poorest 
countries with a great need in the external official support, landlocked ones, because their geo-
graphic location creates additional economic problems, and also countries which export struc-
ture mainly contains raw material goods. It is explained by the fact that they didn’t succeed in 
creating their own industrial base for producing goods with a higher added value that is a source 
of the income growth [6].
One of most important factors that influence a frequency, duration and scales of credit co-
operation with IMF is a dynamics of democratic and institutional transformations that take place 
in a country-recipient. Under conditions of a political crisis or acute ideological polarization of a 
society, the credit cooperation is usually not long, and a country-borrower doesn’t take all costs, 
given by IMF, according to an accepted program. Such government cannot fully realize program 
requirements as to reforms. Countries with essential successes in democratization processes are 
more successful in implementation of program requirements as to economy reformation. Scales 
and duration of such cooperation programs are much shorter [7]. 
One more important cause of increasing duration of cooperation between countries and 
IMF, according to scientists, is a low income level, high level of sovereign debt and default 
threat. These countries usually have the limited access to the market of private financial capi-
tal. So, IMF is transformed in a permanent substitute of private capital markets [6]. The credit 
cooperation duration of almost one quarter of countries-IMF members (among them – Malawi, 
Uganda, Albania, Argentina, Armenia, Georgia and other) doesn’t exceed 50 % of time of their 
membership in IMF [8]. 
The Independent Evolution Office analyzed the duration of credit cooperation between 
countries and IMF and defined such category of countries-IMF borrowers as a prolonged user – 
a country which during seven years of the last ten ones participated in IMF programs, within 
which volumes of given credits exceeded 100 % of their quota. Typical fiscal determinants of 
such countries are the relatively low index of the ratio between tax incomes and GDP and state 
expenditure and GDP, high index of the ratio between the national debt and GDP, relatively low 
level of transparency of the economy, essential volume of the external debt. Among political 
determinants of countries-prolonged users there are named political instability, ethnic fraction-
alization and so on [5].
Most studies of participation of countries in IMF credit programs has a static character, 
within which there are usually studied the importance and presence of political and economic 
factors that condition participation or non-participation in IMF credit programs [9]. The dynamic 
approach in the study provides the empirical estimation of factors that determine the inclination of 
a country to spreading the use of IMF resources.
Original Research Article:
full paper
(2018), «EUREKA: Social and Humanities»
Number 5
39
Economics, econometrics and finance
That is why researchers in modern publications within the dynamic approach separate 
two dynamic components at the analysis of duration and effectiveness of countries’ cooperation 
with IMF: Spell – duration of a continuous series of successive credit programs and recidivism 
indicator. Recidivism characterizes the inclination of a country to spreading credit relations with 
IMF, necessity of a country- IMF member to address it once more for financial help for solving 
problems of macroeconomic stabilization. Recidivism is measured by the duration of the period 
of time between series of credit programs of cooperation between IMF and a country-mem-
ber-borrower [6, 10].
If participation in IMF credit program has a weak effect, the average duration of cooper-
ation with it will increase. And vice versa, if credit resources, within a cooperation program of 
IMF, allow to achieve set aims – namely, to eliminate causes of worsening the state of the payment 
balance of a country, it can be expected that the duration of participation in future IMF programs 
will shorten. 
If previous credit programs had a weak economic effect, recidivism of credit relations be-
tween IMF and a country-member strengthens, so the period of time between participation of a 
country in IMF credit programs shortens. 
The analysis of empirical data gave scientists a possibility to reveal a certain analogue be-
tween country’s participation in IMF credit programs and “revolving doors” [10]. A country enters 
a revolving door, takes part in one or several programs (continuous series of programs) of IMF, 
then came out of IMF participation. This experience may be repeated in some time. For countries 
with a little experience in working with IMF, these doors revolve slowly: the duration of a series 
of programs is relatively more, but the duration of a break in credit cooperation is also long. In 
countries with a large experience of working with IMF, revolving doors move faster. The duration 
of each next series of credit programs becomes shorter, but the one of the period between series of 
programs decreases also, so recidivism of credit cooperation grows. 
During the last fifty years the overwhelming majority of developing countries became 
participants of credit cooperation programs of IMF and took a financial support from this inter-
national organization. Estimating IMF influence on transformation processes in countries of the 
Central-Eastern Europe, it must be noted, that stabilization programs of the Fund attained the set 
aim and gave positive results in Slovenia, Czechia, Hungry and Poland. These countries were first 
in the region that denied IMF financial support and started credit-free cooperation with the Fund. 
For example, the Baltic countries in their time also used IMF financial support, they suc-
ceeded in avoiding deep political crises and obtained essential results in social democratization 
processes, so reformation of economic systems to become full members of the European Union. 
The duration of their cooperation with IMF varied from 3 to 5 years and became an effective in-
strument of macroeconomic stabilization and transformation reforms in 1990 – early 2000. The ef-
fective cooperation between IMF and the Baltic countries resulted not only in fast macroeconomic 
stabilization, but also conditioned the abrupt evolution of relations between them – transition from 
credit relations to technical assistance and preventive credit programs. 
The crucial importance of the institutional development of economic systems of the Baltic 
countries was inherent to technical help, especially in financial, legal spheres and in statistics or-
ganization, given by IMF. Such help became a base of realization of the effective economic policy 
and structural reforms. 
Native and foreign economists and politicians highly appreciate cooperation between the 
Baltic countries and IMF. The professional support as recommendations, formulated by IMF 
coworkers as to methods of macroeconomic stabilization, market transformation of the economic 
system, structural and institutional reforms, formation of the effective macroeconomic policy, 
possibility for countries to get the international support, to overcome internal political contra-
dictions. The effectiveness of the work depends on how this help is considered by power bodies 
and government. 
A guarantee of the effective cooperation between IFO and the Baltic countries is considered, 
first of all, as the presence of the collective memory about market economy in the society, great de-
sire and also political will of power structures of a country to realization of effective transformation 
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reforms, coincided with national interest of reintegration of the economy into the European Union. 
IMF recommendations as to the policy of economy stabilization were a result of debate, discussions 
and compromise and supported by power structures and politicians were successively implemented 
in the state economic policy and strategy. 
It must be noted, that initial conditions of transformation reforms in post-soviet countries 
were essentially worse than in other post-communistic countries of the Central-Eastern Europe. 
The system shock, conditioned by the collapse of the centralized planning system, existed at the 
territory of the former Soviet Union, worsening of trade conditions because of the high energy 
dependence of former republics from Russia, conditioned essential disproportions in both real 
and monetary sectors of the economy [11]. Thus, trade conditions in the Baltic countries after 
USSR disintegration worsened by 20 % that conditioned the decrease of real incomes. For com-
parison, the transformation shock conditioned GDP reduction by 5 % in the countries of the 
Central-Eastern Europe.
Ukraine became a member of IMF in September of 1992 and its quota for that time was 
SDR 997 mln (near 1.6 bil bln USD). The main aims of cooperation with IMF were stabilization 
of the native financial system, structural reforms in the economy and creation of a background 
for the sustainable economic growth. During 1992-2016 IMF had accepted decisions for giving 
Ukraine credits in the sum of 72.1 bil UDS, among which Ukraine really took only 21 410.76 mln 
SDR (equivalent of 31.6 bln USD) [12]. After the next (fourteenth) revision of quotas of IMF coun-
try-members that had taken place in 2016, Ukraine received a confirmation of increasing its quota 
from 1 372 mln SDR to 2 011.8 mln SDR (near 2.8 bln USD) [13]. It allowed it to decrease payments 
for using IMF resources. 
At the same time cooperation with IMF opened for Ukraine possibilities to involve financ-
ing from other international financial organizations (World bank, EBRD, EIB), governments of 
other states – USA, Germany, Japan, Canada and so on. Obtaining credits by Ukraine from IMF 
is a kind of indicator for the development of mutual relations with other international financial 
organizations. 
For today main requirements of IMF to Ukraine for finishing the current program of EFF 
(Extended Fund Facility) is acceptance of the pension reform, creation of anticorruption courts, 
transparent privatization, and also introduction of the automated mechanism for regulating tar-
iffs for gas and heat energy [14]. The history of credit cooperation between Ukraine and IMF 
testifies that the main aim of given credits was the support of the national currency rate and 
financing the deficit of the payment balance of Ukraine and filing of monetary reserves of the 
National bank of Ukraine. The first series of credit programs of IMF for Ukraine lasted mostly 
(1994–2002) – eight years. After that there was a break in credit relations, lasted for 7 years. The 
following series of credit programs was in 2008–2010 – period of deployment and overcoming 
results of the world economic crisis (3 years); after that there was a break – for three years. The 
next stage of cooperation 2014–2018 – is the period after the finish of the Dignity revolution and 
deployment of the great economic crisis in Ukraine on the background of Russian aggression in 
the East of the country. The chronicle of credit relations mainly confirm the results of previous 
studies that the increase of the experience of cooperation between a country and IMF favors 
shortening of each next series of credit programs, and duration of the period between series 
of programs also decreases, so recidivism of credit cooperation increases. But there must be 
taken into account the peculiarity of cooperation between Ukraine and IMF – breaks in credit 
relations were mainly forced, Ukraine couldn’t take given costs completely mainly because of 
unrealized conditions of programs by it. The last program of cooperation with IMF, planned for 
2015-2018, but really interrupted in spring of 2017, turned out to be the most effective. Ukraine 
received just four tranches for one program, the record sum – near 8.7 USD of expected 17 bln 
USD. The matter is that none previous credit program was finished by the complete realization 
of admitted liabilities by Ukraine and complete payment of the whole sum, provided by the 
program. As a result Ukraine didn’t receive more than a half of the credit sum, provided by 
the Fund. There was no case, when Ukraine succeeded in agreeing about the next program to 
continue credit cooperation. 
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Because of the wide inclusion of countries in IMF credit programs, there appeared a ques-
tion about their effectiveness and contribution in economic growth processes. Authors of the for-
eign and native economic literature offer a series of methodological approaches to estimating the 
effectiveness of such cooperation. In first turn economists try to estimate the direct influence of 
financial help on the economic growth and other parameters of the economic activity. But reali-
zation of the objective analysis faces essential methodological complications. The matter is that 
countries-IMF members address for financial help only when their economies suffer from short-
term problems, connected with regulation of results of the external imbalance and in periods of 
macroeconomic destabilization. 
Based on empirical data about the dynamics of GDP and participation of 130 countries in 
IMF credit programs during 1975–2000, researchers conducted the regression analysis of the influ-
ence of IMF credit help on the economic growth. It gave grounds for a conclusion that participation 
of countries-IMF members in credit programs had a negative influence on the economic growth. At 
the same time, received credits induce weak negative impulses on the development of democracy 
and rule of law in countries-recipients [15].
As a result of the conducted regression analysis for 20 countries with the transition econo-
my (Albania, Byelorussia, Bulgaria, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Mace-
donia, Moldova, Poland, Russia, Romania, Serbia and Montenegro, Slovakia, Slovenia, Hungry, 
Ukraine, Croatia, Czechia) researchers didn’t reveal any direct influence of IMF credits on such 
parameters as unemployment level, gross internal savings, joint expenditures of a state, GDP 
increment, export of goods and services, index of the real exchange rate. It testifies to the insuf-
ficient effectiveness of the mechanism of giving and using IMF credits in the development of the 
production sphere, innovative activity, regulation of state expenditures, influence of the structure 
and growth of GDP [16].
From our point of view, an approach to estimating the effectiveness of cooperation be-
tween IMF and Ukraine, based on the analysis of the modified four-factor production function 
for the Ukrainian economy, that includes labor, capital, institutional index among factors, 
creating incomes, and IMF credits as an additional factor, is interesting. Based on the econo-
metric estimation of the contribution of each factor in the process of incomes creation, there 
was made a conclusion that the factors of capital and labor make a positive contribution in 
GDP production, whereas one of IMF credits has a positive, but very unessential role. It gave 
grounds to decline a hypothesis about the stimulating influence of IMF credits on the econom-
ic growth [17].
The analysis of the contribution of IMF credits in the dynamics of key macroeconomic 
parameters of Ukraine at different stages of cooperation gave a possibility to make ambiguous 
conclusions. 
Thus, at its primary stages GDP credits really had an important positive influence of the 
GDP dynamics and other macroeconomic parameters. But where the period of loan repayment be-
gan and pure transfers of financial flows from IMF decreased even to negative values, the positive 
dependence decreases or even became negative. Exceeded rates of the increment of payments for 
given IMF credits over GDP growth rates mean that the stimulating influence on the total demand 
is exhausted (Table 1, Fig. 1–3).
IMF credits, received by Ukraine in crisis periods (Fig. 1), became an important factor of 
increasing gold-monetary reserves of the country, so favored the increase of the external liquidity 
and trust of foreign partners to the financial stability of the Ukrainian economy. 
As it is testified by the empirical data, presented in Table 1, Fig. 2 and regression analy-
sis results (Table 2) Ukraine doesn’t demonstrate the influence of IMF credits on the economic 
growth. In such analysis it is expedient to take into account other factors with the essential influ-
ence on its dynamics – namely the conjuncture at world product markets that play a key role in the 
export goods structure (especially, agricultural products, black and color metals), negative influ-
ences of the world financial crisis of 2008–2010, occupation of Crimea and war at Donbas, resulted 
in losses of the essential part of the industrial potential of the country, and not very effective policy 
of NBU and Cabinet Council. 
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Table 1
IMF loans and main macroeconomic indicators of Ukraine, 1994–2017 years
Year
Amount of 
received 
creditmln 
SDR
Payment of 
interests and 
commisions, 
mln SDR
Repayment 
of credit 
body, mln 
SDR
Net 
transfer, 
mln SDR
State 
(public) 
external 
debt to 
GDP 
ratio, %
GDP, mln 
USD 
Real GDP 
growth 
rate (% of 
previous 
year) 
Inflation rate 
(December 
to December) 
%
Bal-
ance of 
current 
account, 
% of 
GDP, %
1994 249.3 0.04 0 249.2 9.18 52549.56 –22.9 401 –2.4
1995 787.9 27.5 0 760.4 17.04 48213.87 –12.2 181.7 –3.2
1996 536.0 51.3 0 484.8 19.57 44558.08 –10.0 39.7 –2.7
1997 207.3 74.1 0 133.2 19.14 50150.4 –3.0 10.1 –2.7
1998 281.8 84.8 77.3 119.7 26.48 41883.24 –1.9 20. –3.0
1999 466.6 80.7 407.0 –21.1 39.52 31580.64 –0.2 19.2 3.0
2000 190.1 92.5 643.5 –545.9 33.1 31261.53 5.9 25.8 3.9
2001 290.0 68.2 361.2 –139.4 26.61 38009.34 9.2 6.1 3.7
2008 3000.0 8.6 215.6 2776.8 10.27 179992.4 2.3 22.3 –7.0
2009 4000.0 87.4 57.3 3885.3 22.73 117227.8 –14.8 12.3 –1.5
2010 2250.0 157.7 0 2092.3 25.48 136013.2 4.1 9.1 –2.1
2014 2972.7 38.6 2390.6 544 29.4 133503.4 –6.8 24.0 –3.4
2015 4728.1 106.3 968.8 3653 47.9 91030.96 –9.9 43.3 –0.2
2016 716.1 155.5 0 560.6 48.9 93270.48 2.3 12.4 –1.4
2017 734.1 220.4 628.8 115.2 43.7 112154.2 2.5 13.7 –1.9
Note: + – rate of dollar in Ukrainian karbovanets. Source: [12, 18, 19]
 Fig. 1. Received IMF credits and international reserve assets of Ukraine, 1994–2017 
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Fig 2. Net transfers of IMF credit resources and GDP of Ukraine, 1994–2017
Fig. 3. Amount of received IMF loans and State external debt to GDP ratio, % 1994–2017
The credit financing of IMF has an essential influence on formation of the external debt of 
Ukraine (Fig. 3, Table 2). Such tendency determines the increase of expenditures for its service 
and essential lead of external debt volumes as to international reserves of the country, so weaken-
ing of parameters of the debt stability of the state. 
The regression analysis results and their testing for exactness, adequacy and validity give 
grounds to state that given IMF credits, taken by Ukraine, especially the pure transfer of credit 
resources is not a factor of the economic growth during the whole cooperation period. 
It can be explained, especially by taking into account the specificity of financial resources, 
received from IMF – they usually have a short-term or middle-term character and are directed 
mainly on attaining the aim of macroeconomic stability that must be accompanied by reforms 
realization. Direct recipients of these resources are the sector of state management and bodies of 
monetary-credit regulation. Such credit resources are directed on the immediate overcoming of 
main macroeconomic disproportions in the economic system, caused by the deficit of state financ-
es, lack of gold-monetary resources, growth of the external debt and decrease of the debt stability 
of the country. 
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Table 2
Results of econometric estimation of the influence of credit cooperation between Ukraine and IMF on the 
economic growth, 1994–2017 
X Y Regression equa-tion 
Correla-
tion coef-
ficient 
Coefficient 
of determi-
nation R2
d-Durbin-Wat-
son statistic Student`s t-tes F-test
d
Auto-
correla-
tion 
Tem Tcr
α
Fem Fcr
α
Net transfers, 
mln SDR
GDP (mln 
USD) Y=–2.3345X+93064 –0.07 0.0055 0.2004 added 0.3552  < 1.7171 0.1852 > 0.05
Credit, 
received from 
IMF (mln 
SDR)
Balance of 
current account 
(% of GDP) 
Y=–0.0006X–0.0343 –0.19 0.0343 0.6438 added 0.9044 < 1.7171 0.7228 > 0.05
Credit, 
received from 
IMF (mln 
SDR)
Inflation rate 
(December to 
December), %
Y=–0.0019X+39.401 –0.03 0.0010 0.4358 added 0.1528 > 1.7171 0.0289 < 0.05
Credit liabil-
ities for IMF 
(mln SDR) 
(1999–2017)
Gross external 
debt for the 
end of year (bil 
USD)  
(1999–2017)
Y=4.7761X–6942.6 0.46 0.2199 0.9986 added 2.1829 > 1.7396 0.0001 < 0.05
So, the expected effect is indirect. At the same time IMF usually gives credits only subject 
to realization of arrangements of the rigid fiscal and deflation policy that, in their turn, condition 
the worsening of macroeconomic indicators in the nearest future. Under these conditions the ex-
pedience of analyzing the direct influence of the given credit cost on IMF on the economic growth 
is doubtful. 
For guaranteeing the economic growth, Ukraine must not only receive IMF credits, but 
also needs the long-term financing as investments in the real economic sector. For today the credit 
cooperation with IMF has not already became a catalyst of the economic activity and trajectory of 
the sustainable economic growth of Ukraine that is a guarantee of the increase of the population 
welfare level. 
5. Discussion
The chronology of credit relations between Ukraine and IMF mainly proves conclusions 
of previous studies about the effect of the Revolving door mechanism, manifested in fact that the 
duration of each next series of credit program (spell) shortens and the period between them de-
creases too, so recidivism of credit cooperation increases. But there must be taken into account the 
specificity of the type of cooperation between Ukraine and IMF – breaks in credit relations were 
usually forced. Ukraine couldn’t withdraw funds, approved to it, in the full volume mainly because 
of non-realization of program conditions by it. 
Ukraine as other transition economies needs involving credit resources from international 
financial organizations as a vitally important condition of providing macroeconomic stability, so 
the economic growth. Inability of the country to solve problems of financing, first of all, budget 
expenditures results in the fact that it takes new monetary costs as a debt, that becomes a part of 
its financial resources and due to correspondent economic mechanisms can influence the economic 
growth. But such instillations can have no positive results. A cause of such scenario can be both 
political and economic instability, negative shocks in world commodity markets, its government is 
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unable to conduct the effective economic policy that is directly connected with the deepening of 
democratization processes in it. 
Despite the differences in methodological and instrumental approaches to estimating the 
effectiveness of credit cooperation between developing countries and IMF, scientists made a con-
clusion about the absence of the essential positive influence of IMF credits on the economic growth 
in countries-recipients [15–17]. 
The estimation of the effectiveness of cooperation between Ukraine IMF presented in the 
article, proved the previous conclusions – there is traced no positive influence of given Fund credits 
on GDP, external debt level and other macroeconomic parameters of Ukraine for today. 
Ukraine has not achieved the proper consensus with IMF specialists as to arrangements of 
macroeconomic stabilization and has not use their recommendations as to conducting structural 
reforms and institutional development of its economic system for today effectively. 
Recommendations and requirements, set by IMF IMF staff members, which realization is a 
condition of the further financing of the Ukrainian economy often have no proper support among 
the population, different political forces and even power structures. That is why their realization 
has often formal, imperfect character, so is not a guarantee of the economic development. 
Another cause of the low effectiveness is the unsteadiness of the Ukrainian economic sys-
tem, manifested in defects of mechanisms of its functioning, namely – corruption, unreasonable 
use of involved resources, non-systematic accumulation of the state debt, resulted in essential 
threats as default or inflation and so on [20].
One of methodological problems that need further studying is the improvement formation of 
new approaches of analyzing the effectiveness of credit cooperation between transition economies 
and IMF, especially the use of adequate indicators for estimating the economic effectiveness of credit 
programs and technical assistance. In such analysis it is important to reveal directions of causative 
connections, to separate economic effects from the influence of other factors of macroeconomic sta-
bilization and macroeconomic growth in a certain country. At the same time it is necessary to take 
into account political-institutional conditions of credit relations between a country and IMF. This ap-
proach will give a possibility to define determinants of spells and recidivism for transition economies. 
6. Conclusions
1. A natural result of global processes of financialization of the world economy is evolu-
tionary changes in the institutional model of IMF functioning, which, in their turn, provided the 
increase of the effectiveness of mechanisms of organizing accountability and management of the 
Fund, provision of transparency of its activity for the world community, increase of its competitive-
ness, strengthening of its authority and trust to it among stakeholders. 
2. Among factors that determine a frequency and duration of credit cooperation between 
the Fund and transition economies is the experience of a country-recipient in cooperation with 
international financial organizations, economic effectiveness of previous programs, dynamics of 
democratic and institutional transformations, that take place in a country-recipient, indices of the 
sovereign debt stability of a country, implementation degree of technical assistance and IMF rec-
ommendations that favor macroeconomic stabilization, formation of the effective macroeconomic 
policy and institutional development of the economic system, political will and support of reforms, 
offered by the Fund, by power structures and wide layers of the population of a country-recipient. 
3. The chronology of credit relations between Ukraine and IMF mainly proves theoretical 
conclusions that the increase of the experience in cooperation between a country and IMF often 
favors the decrease of duration of each next series of credit programs, and the period between them 
decreases too, so recidivism of credit cooperation increases. But the specificity of the type of coopera-
tion between Ukraine and IMF – breaks in credit relations were usually forced. Ukraine couldn’t take 
costs, given to it, in the full volume mainly because of non-realization of program conditions by it.
4. The econometric estimation of the influence of IMF credit help on indices of the macro-
economic dynamics in Ukraine for 1994-2017 gives grounds to state that the given credits didn’t 
become a catalyst of the economic growth. Credit resources are directed on the immediate over-
coming of main macroeconomic disproportions in the economic system, caused by the deficit of 
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state finances, lack of gold-monetary resources, growth of the external debt and decrease of the 
debt stability of the country. The condition of giving such credits is realization of arrangements of 
the rigid fiscal and deflation policy that, in their turn, condition the worsening of macroeconomic 
parameters in the nearest future. Under these conditions the expedience of analyzing the direct 
influence of given credit costs on IMF on the economic growth is doubtful. 
5. Recommendations and requirements of IMF, which realization is a condition of the 
further financing of the Ukrainian economy often have no proper support among the popula-
tion, different political forces and even power structures, and their realization has often formal, 
imperfect character and doesn’t favor the institutional development of the unstable economic 
system of Ukraine. 
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